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I. INTRODUCTION
Judges are often said to enjoy a certain “mystique” that arises immediately
upon their election or appointment to the bench. 1 To some extent, this phenomenon may be based on the belief that judges are, in Blackstone’s words, “the ‘depositories of the law; the living oracles.’” 2 However, this sense of awe may also
be attributable to the shroud of secrecy that surrounds much of what judges do. 3
Although society would doubtless benefit from an increased understanding of
a number of types of judicial behaviors (for example, judicial deliberation and
decision-making), there is one issue about which virtually nothing is known,
namely the means by which a new judge learns the art of judging. 4 Unlike judges
in civil law countries, who undertake specialized coursework in judicial studies
from the earliest stages of their careers,5 judges in the United States typically
“[take] the oath, [step] onto the bench, and [proceed] to fill the judicial role as if
born in the robe.”6 This tradition, which is rooted in medieval English practice, is
based on the assumption that anyone who has become a senior litigator is sufficiently well-prepared to act as a judge.7
Although this approach may have been acceptable in the Middle Ages, much
has changed since then. Not only has the legal community recognized that acting
as a judge is not the same as acting as an advocate, 8 but the duties of a judge have
1
Emily Kadens, The Puzzle of Judicial Education: The Case of Chief Justice William de Grey, 75
BROOK. L. REV. 143, 145 (2009); see also Charles Fried, A Meditation on Judicial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1227, 1227 (2004) (“There is an aura about judges that we do not want them to dissipate . . . .”).
2
See Kadens, supra note 1, at 145 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69).
3
Lawyers and lay people are often fascinated by first-hand, “insider” reports of what goes on
behind chambers doors. Thus, books authored by former clerks at the U.S. Supreme Court are often in
high demand, since they are seen as a means of demystifying certain aspects of the judicial process.
See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF THE MODERN
SUPREME COURT (1998); TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND
INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006); TODD C. PEPPERS & ARTEMUS WARD, IN
CHAMBERS: STORIES OF SUPREME COURT LAW CLERKS AND THEIR JUSTICES (2013); ARTEMUS WARD
& DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERER’S APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT (2006).
4
See Kadens, supra note 1, at 143-46. Some commentators refer to the process of learning how to
be a judge as “socialization” rather than education. See id. at 146 (including citations).
5
See id. at 145; Charles H. Koch, Jr., The Advantages of the Civil Law Judicial Design as the
Model for Emerging Legal Systems, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 139, 143 (2004).
6
Kadens, supra note 1, at 143. Although some proposals have been made regarding the development of a form of pre-appointment training, that approach is still in its infancy and will in any case be
voluntary in nature. See ABA, Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, Report to the House of
Delegates, Recommendation No. 113, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
leadership/2009/midyear/recommendations/113.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Aug. 7, 2015). Some
observers suggest that U.S. law schools should undertake efforts to educate future judges about issues
relating to adjudication. See Sande L. Buhai et al., The Role of Law Schools in Educating Judges to
Increase Access to Justice, 24 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 161, nn. 115-59 (2011).
7
See Kadens, supra note 1, at 144.
8
See Keith R. Fisher, Education for Judicial Aspirants, 43 AKRON L. REV. 163, 168-69 (2010);
Kadens, supra note 1, at 143-44.
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changed significantly since medieval times.9 Furthermore, the various methods of
selecting judges in the United States (which includes judicial appointments, judicial elections and various combinations of the two procedures) are quite different
than those used in sixteenth century England.10 In fact, there is no constitutional
requirement that judges in the United States be qualified as lawyers, which allows
a significant number of non-legally-trained individuals to sit as judges. 11
Concerns about judicial preparedness led to major reforms in the 1960s and
1970s, when the United States became the first common law country to adopt a
system of judicial education.12 Over the years, judicial education has become “big
business” in the United States, and numerous public and private institutions now
offer educational programming to both state and federal judges. 13 However, requirements regarding judicial education vary considerably across the nation, 14

9
See Fisher, supra note 8, at 182-85. For example, judicial caseloads have increased dramatically, particularly in the last few decades. See S.I. Strong, Writing Reasoned Decisions and Opinions: A
Guide For Novice, Experienced and Foreign Judges, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 93, 95 [hereinafter Strong,
Writing]. Judges are also having to take on additional duties, ranging from case management (leading
to the rise of the “managerial” judge rather than the professional adjudicator) to alternative dispute
resolution (as a result of the increased emphasis on settlement). See Fisher, supra note 8, at 170, 182;
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378 (1982).
10
See Barbara F. Berenson, Book Review, The People’s Court: Pursuing Judicial Independence in
America By Jed Handelsman Shugerman, 94 MASS. L. REV. 147, 147 (2013) (reviewing JED
HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURT: PURSUING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA
(2012)); Kadens, supra note 1, at 144-45.
11
See North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 339 (1976); Sylvia A. Law, Who Gets to Interpret the Constitution? The Case of Mayors and Marriage Equality, 3 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 1, 11
(2007) (noting “in the early years of the Republic many judges were not lawyers and, even today,
many judges are not”); Paul Biederman, An Education Revolution From the Field, SCH. REFORMED
(Dec. 5, 2012), https://schoolreformed.wordpress.com/2012/12/05/post-13-an-education-revolutionfrom-the-field-continued/ (noting that “in our state, most magistrate, municipal and probate judges, as
well as most tribal court judges, never went to law school; many never even completed college”).
12
See LIVINGSTON ARMYTAGE, EDUCATING JUDGES: TOWARDS A NEW MODEL OF CONTINUING
JUDICIAL LEARNING 12-14 (1996); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-29 (2015) (establishing the Federal
Judicial Center in 1967); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., www.fjc.gov (last visited Aug. 7, 2015) [hereinafter FJC
Website].
13
ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 14 (citation omitted). Perhaps the most well-respected judicial
education center in the United States is the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), which focuses on research
and education of the federal judiciary. See FJC Website, supra note 12. A number of states have their
own judicial education programs, although many states also rely on the services of the National Judicial College, a Nevada-based non-profit originally created by the American Bar Association, to educate their judges. See NAT’L JUDICIAL COUNCIL, http://www.judges.org/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2015);
ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 13. For-profit judicial education institutions also exist, although some
questions have been raised about the objectivity of privately funded programming. See CTR. FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY, Corporations, Pro-Business Nonprofits Foot Bill for Judicial Seminars (May 27, 2014)
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/03/28/12368/corporations-pro-business-nonprofits-foot-billjudicial-seminars (noting that “[c]onservative foundations, multinational oil companies and a prescription drug maker were the most frequent sponsors of more than 100 expense-paid educational seminars
attended by federal judges over a 4 ½ year period”); Bruce A. Green, May Judges Attend Privately
Funded Educational Programs? Should Judicial Education Be Privatized?: Questions of Judicial
Ethics and Policy, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 941, 941-44 (2002).
14
See NAT’L JUDICIAL EDUC. PROGRAM, Testimony to the ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct 15 (Apr. 2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/judicialethics/resources/Comm_Code_HechtSchafran_0504ddt.authcheckdam.pdf;
ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 13, 29-40; Patricia H. Murrell & Philip D. Gould, Educating for Therapeutic Judging: Strategies, Concepts, and Outcomes, 78 REV. JUR. U. P. R. 129, 136 (2009).
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with some courts—most notably those in the federal system—failing to require
their judges to participate in any educational programming whatsoever. 15
While the initiatives of the 1960s and 1970s represent a significant move
forward, a number of problems still remain. 16 One of the most pressing issues
involves the degree of control exerted by the judiciary over the scope, content and
methods of judicial education. Conventional wisdom suggests that the judiciary
should “take primary responsibility for providing continuing judicial education,” a
view that is based on claims of expertise (i.e., the belief that only judges can appreciate the particular pressures and demands of acting as a judge and thus are the
only persons qualified to act as instructors) and the need to protect judicial independence.17 However, questions have been raised in a variety of contexts about
the propriety of self-regulation, since self-interest may tempt individuals to act in
a manner that is contrary to the public interest.18 Concerns about self-regulation
may be particularly pressing in cases involving judicial education, given the role
that the judiciary plays in a well-ordered society.19
It is possible to explain the current approach to judicial education in relatively
benign terms. For example, the large degree of judicial control over judicial education may simply be the result of acculturation and tradition. 20 However, the

15
By tradition, most if not all incoming federal judges attend new judge orientation sessions offered by the Federal Judicial Center. However, participation is purely voluntary.
16
One of the most pressing issues concerns funding for judicial education. See ABA Commission
on the 21st Century Judiciary, Preserving the Judiciary’s Institutional Legitimacy, 37 BRIEF 54, 56-57
(2008), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/tips/faic/16_PreservingJudiciary.pdf. Without public
funding, judges may resort to privately funded educational programs, which carry with them the risk of
political influence and bias. See CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, supra note 13; Green, supra note 13, at
941-44.
17
ABA Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary, supra note 16, at 56; see also CHERYL
THOMAS, REVIEW OF JUDICIAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 32-33 (May
2006) (constituting a report prepared for the British Judicial Studies Board), available at
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/socio-legal/docs/Review_of_Judicial_Train.pdf; J. Clifford Wallace, Judicial Education and Training in Asia and the Pacific, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 849, 858-59 (2000) [hereinafter Wallace, Asia].
18
See Cristie Ford, New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty: Lessons From Financial
Regulation, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 441, 442-43, 465 (discussing self-regulation and the recent financial
crisis); Andrew M. Perlman, Toward a Unified Theory of Professional Regulation, 55 FLA. L. REV.
977, 1016 (2003) (discussing self-regulation of the legal profession). Although proponents of “new
governance theory” praise the departure from a “command and control” model of regulation toward
self-regulation, they do not advocate an entirely deregulated approach. See IAN AYRES & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 3 (1992)
(“Good policy analysis is not about choosing between the free market and government regulation . . .
sound policy analysis is about understanding private regulation . . . and how it is interdependent with
state regulation.”); Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
875, 882 (2003) (suggesting “the way past the current impasse is to return to [a] commitment to a legal
decisionmaking process that is deeply informed about the institutions with which legal actors interact”); On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law and
Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2100 (2008) (reviewing RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
STUMBLE, PREDICT, NUDGE: HOW BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS INFORMS LAW AND POLICY (2008) and
DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008)).
19
See Jonathan Lippman, A Proactive Judicial Bench: Confronting the Crisis of the Unrepresented, 2011 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 1 (discussing the role of the judiciary in a well-functioning society).
20
See Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers’ Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787, 792, 797 (1980) (noting overexposure to problematic practices dulls perception of impropriety); Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil
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situation can also be viewed from a much more troubling perspective, namely that
of regulatory capture. 21
Regulatory capture (also known as “agency capture”) arises when an “organized interest group[] successfully act[s] to vindicate [its] goals through government policy at the expense of the public interest.” 22 Applying this principle to
judicial education may seem somewhat strange, since the judiciary cannot be considered to be either an “agency” in the technical sense or a special interest group. 23
In fact, the judicial branch is often considered to be the primary means of combatting regulatory capture. 24 However, concerns about capture appear to be appropriate here, based on (1) the high degree of control currently wielded by the judiciary
on matters relating to judicial education; (2) resistance by judges to any independent external oversight on matters relating to judicial education; and (3) the potentially significant number of negative externalities generated by the current system.25 As a result, the existing approach to judicial education can arguably be said
to meet the classic definition of agency capture.26

Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1343 (1978) (noting that
judges are also subject to the pressure of acculturation).
21
See Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency
Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1340 (2013).
22
Id. at 1340; see also Dorit Rubenstein Reiss, The Benefits of Capture, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
569, 578 (2012).
23
What constitutes an agency in U.S. law is a complicated issue, but the judiciary, as separate
branch of government, would not be included in any of those definitions. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(B)
(2015) (defining “agency” for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act and excluding “the courts
of the United States”); see also Kimberly N. Brown, Presidential Control of the Elite “Non-Agency,”
88 N.C. L. REV. 71, 72-73 (2009) (defining various types of hybrid or independent agencies). However, there are two agencies—the FJC and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC)—that
are affiliated with the U.S. federal judiciary. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 601-12 (2015) (establishing the
AOUSC); 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-29 (2015) (establishing the FJC); Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/
AdministrativeOffice.aspx (last visited Aug. 7, 2015); FJC Website, supra note 12.
24
See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 61-63
(1985).
25
See ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 150; THOMAS, supra note 17, at 32-33; Wallace, Asia, supra
note 17, at 858-59; see also NAT’L JUDICIAL EDUC. PROGRAM, supra note 14, at 15. Here, negative
externalities might include costs associated with judicial inefficiency related to poor case management
skills or generated as a result of appeals resulting from poor judicial practices. See Lillian R. BeVier,
Law, Economics, and the Power of State, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 8 n.13 (1997) (defining a
negative externality as arising “when some costs of an activity spill over to parties not directly involved in the activity” in question).
26
Notably,
[t]he literature uses a variety of definitions to explain the results or features of capture.
One definition suggests that in a situation of capture, regulated industry members
“persuade regulators to alter rules or be lenient in enforcing those rules.” A somewhat
different definition emphasizes the consequences, suggesting that captured regulatory
agencies are “persistently serving the interests of regulated industries to the neglect or
harm of more general, or ‘public,’ interests. . . . [T]he accusation implies excessive
regulated industry influence on regulatory agencies.”
Reiss, supra note 22, at 578 (footnotes omitted). Regulatory capture can arise despite the best intent of
the public officials involved. See Sidney A. Shapiro, The Complexity of Regulatory Capture: Diagnosis, Causality, and Remediation, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 221, 222 (2012) (noting “regulatory
capture can occur despite the desire of public officials to protect the public” and discussing “how
regulated entities are able to dominate the presentation of information to agencies, producing information asymmetries that make it more likely agencies will adopt industry-favored policies”).
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Although some scholars have declined to characterize the concept of capture
as either positive or negative,27 regulatory capture is generally considered problematic from both a practical and theoretical perspective. 28 Capture of the judiciary could be particularly harmful, given the connection between a wellfunctioning judiciary and an effective system of justice. 29
This phenomenon suggests a pressing need for further scrutiny into matters
relating to the education of judges in this country.30 This Essay therefore considers of a number of fundamental issues relating to judicial education in the United
States so as to consider, at least as a preliminary matter, whether regulatory capture exists. Given the scope of this Essay, some issues are necessarily excluded.31
Nevertheless, this Essay hopes to trigger a deeper debate about judicial education
in this country.
The structure of the analysis is as follows. First, the Essay considers certain
obstacles to research concerning judicial education as a means of determining why
more scholars have not sounded an alarm regarding practices in this field (Section
II). The Essay then addresses a number of issues relating to the current approach
to judicial education to determine whether and to what extent judicial control over
this issue can be considered problematic (Section III). That analysis leads logically into a discussion of various ways that the possibility of regulatory capture of
judicial education could be diminished (Section IV). Finally, the Essay concludes
by drawing together various strands of analysis (Section VI).

II. INVISIBLE BARRIERS TO SCHOLARLY SCRUTINY OF JUDICIAL
EDUCATION
In many ways, the reform movement of the 1960s and 1970s marked the high
point for scholarly interest in judicial education. 32 Recent years have seen a significant shortage of critical commentary in this field, 33 which is somewhat prob27

See Reiss, supra note 22, at 571-72.
See David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. 329, 333-35 (2014).
See Lippman, supra note 19, at 1.
30
Notably, the diversity of judicial education centers in the United States does not offset the claim
that judicial education has been subject to regulatory capture by the judiciary, if, as appears to be the
case, control over the content and method of educational programming is controlled directly or indirectly by judges. See infra notes 94-102 and accompanying text (discussing individual and institutional influences).
31
For example, this discussion does not reflect a detailed discussion of the number and types of
negative externalities that arise as a result from the current approach to judicial education, although
certain types of empirical data suggests such negative externalities do exist. See supra note 25 (defining negative externalities); see also infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text (regarding public perception of the judiciary and improper judicial behavior).
32
See ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 12-13.
33
See Kadens, supra note 1, at 144-45 (“[S]cholars . . . of the judiciary have paid limited attention
to the question of how an appointee learns to be a judge.”); THOMAS, supra note 17, at 113 (noting
“there have been few major developments in this field since the 1970s”). The academic literature on
judicial education is relatively sparse and largely outdated. See Diane E. Cowdrey, Educating Into the
Future: Creating an Effective System of Judicial Education, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 885, 889 (2010) (suggesting very little discussion exists regarding both the primary purpose of judicial education and how
that purpose is to be achieved); Virginia A. Hettinger et al., Acclimation Effects and Separate Opinion
Writing in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 792, 792-93 (2003) (citing scholarship);
Kadens, supra note 1, at 144-45 & nn. 2, 4 (providing citations regarding the socialization of judges
and the existence of judicial education centers that are almost entirely from the 1970s and 1980s).
There are a number of judicially-authored pieces, but those tend to be written from an anecdotal rather
28
29
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lematic for the current discussion, given that questions regarding regulatory capture should be considered within a larger analytical context.34
To some extent, the lack of scholarship in this field could signal a consensus
that the problems of judicial education have been resolved. That issue will be
considered in Section III in conjunction with issues relating to regulatory capture.35 However, the dearth of critical commentary in this area of law could be the
result of other factors. Indeed, closer analysis suggests that scholarly research into
judicial education has been hindered by a number of “invisible barriers” that have
little, if anything, to do with the quality and nature of judicial education in this
country.
Analysis of these “invisible barriers” is important because these obstacles do
more than impede independent evaluation of the way in which judges learn how to
carry out their judicial functions. Instead, these phenomena describe why the
judiciary is reluctant to cede control over judicial education and why regulatory
capture may have occurred.
It is impossible to consider all potential barriers to legal education in the
scope of the current Essay. 36 Instead, this section will focus on three issues that
are particularly relevant to the current discussion: the lack of consensus as to the
role and function of judges; a belief that other mechanisms, such as judicial selection procedures, are adequate to create a well-functioning and well-informed judiciary; and concerns about the extent to which judicial education infringes on judicial independence.

than scholarly perspective and are therefore not perhaps as objective as one might hope. See Chad M.
Oldfather, Book Review, Oral History and the Study of the Judiciary, 78 GEO. WASH. U. L. REV. 846,
849 (2010); see also Lenore Alpert et al., Becoming A Judge: The Transition From Advocate to Arbiter, 62 JUDICATURE 325 (Feb. 1979); Charles S. Claxton, Characteristics of Effective Judicial Education Programs, 76 JUDICATURE 11 (Jun.-Jul. 1992); Susanne DiPietro et al., Judicial Qualifications
and Judicial Performance: Is There a Relationship?, 83 JUDICATURE 196 (Jan.-Feb. 2000); Henry J.
Friendly, Reflections On A Lawyer Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE L. J. 218 (1961); Jessie B. Gunther,
Reflections on the Challenging Proliferation of Mental Health Issues in the District Court and the
Need for Judicial Education, 57 ME. L. REV. 541 (2005); Aaron Ment, The Transition from Lawyer to
Judge: Connecticut’s Pre-Bench Orientation Program, 73 JUDICATURE 281 (Feb.-Mar. 1990); Patricia
H. Murrell et al., Courts as Learning Organizations: Toward a Unifying Vision, 93 JUDICATURE 14
(July-Aug. 2009); Paul Nejelski, Symposium Seeks New Approaches to Judicial Education, 74
JUDICATURE 104 (Aug.-Sep. 1990); On Becoming A Judge: Socialization to the Judicial Role, 69
JUDICATURE 139 (Oct.-Nov. 1985); David Richert, Federal-State Educational Programs, 86
JUDICATURE 172 (Nov.-Dec. 2002); Franklin M. Zweig & Diane E. Cowdrey, Educating Judges for
Adjudication of New Life Technologies, 83 JUDICATURE 157 (Nov.-Dec. 1999); Jack B. Weinstein, The
Contribution of Henry G. Manne Towards the Education of the American Judiciary, 50 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 421 (1999).
34
See Reiss, supra note 22, at 571-72. Limited analyses of judicial self-regulation exist, although
they focus primarily on issues relating to removal and discipline of judges. See Amanda Frost, Judicial Ethics and Supreme Court Exceptionalism, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 443 (2013); Peter M. Shane,
Who May Discipline or Remove Federal Judges? A Constitutional Analysis, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 209,
233 (1993).
35
See infra notes 65-102 and accompanying text.
36
Other commentators have discussed these issues at more length. See THOMAS, supra note 17, at
110-14.
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A. Lack of Consensus Regarding the Role of Judges in U.S. Courts
The first issue to consider involves the lack of consensus about what constitutes “good” or “appropriate” judging.37 This debate, which includes both practical38 and theoretical elements,39 is both central and preliminary to the question of
judicial education, since a judicial curriculum cannot be developed without
agreement on the types of skills and attributes that should be taught. 40
Up until this point, the only subject that has won universal acceptance as an
appropriate topic for judicial education involves courses concerning recent developments in substantive or procedural law. 41 While no one doubts that judges must
be competent in both content and procedure, this educational approach suggests
that legal expertise is the sole hallmark of a good judge. In fact, judges do much
more than simply apply the law in a mechanistic manner.42 Instead, judges must
master a wide range of personal and professional skills if they are to do their jobs
properly.43

37

See Lippman, supra note 19, at 4 (noting that the role of judiciary goes beyond mere adjudication). Even the American Bar Association (ABA) is unable to determine this issue with any degree of
specificity, as demonstrated by its model code of judicial conduct, which includes only four canons,
which are all quite general.
See ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, ABA
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_code_of_judicial_
conduct.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2015). Some academic studies into the nature of judging do exist,
although they, too, could be expanded upon. See Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1385-91 (2012); Lippman, supra note 19, at
1; Chad M. Oldfather, Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of Law, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 847, 896 (2012);
Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283,
1303-17 (2008); S.I. Strong, Limits of Procedural Choice of Law, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1027, 106263, 1076-81 (2014).
38
For example, numerous questions arise with respect to evidentiary concerns, such as the adequacy of eyewitness testimony or the effect of implicit bias on adjudication. See Brandon L. Garrett,
Eyewitnesses and Exclusion, 65 VAND. L. REV. 451, 451-52 (2012); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing
Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 481-82 (2010); see also
Andrea L. McArdle, Using a Narrative Lens to Understand Empathy And How It Matters In Judging,
9 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 173 (2012); Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination, Experience, and Judicial Decision-Making, 85 SO. CAL. L. REV. 313,
323 (2012).
39
For example, one of the key controversies involves the question of whether judges should focus
solely on the merits of the case in front of them or whether they should consider the development of
the common law in a particular field. See Ethan J. Lieb et al., A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101
CAL. L. REV. 699, 700 (2013); Strong, Writing, supra note 9, at 113.
40
See ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 148; Cowdrey, supra note 33, at 890.
41
This issue goes to the competence of the judiciary, as noted in the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct. See ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, supra note 37, Canon 2. However, there is
growing support for courses concerning certain types of “‘judge craft’ - the specific skills judges need
to do their job, including skills training in areas such as opinion writing, sentencing, dealing with
certain types of litigants and evidence.” THOMAS, supra note 17, at 13-17.
42
See ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 7-8; THOMAS, supra note 17, at 13-17.
43
See THOMAS, supra note 17, at 13-17. Debate often arises as to whether certain characteristics—including those, such as integrity and independence, that are believed to be fundamental to good
judging—are either inherent (and therefore not susceptible to educational efforts) or adequately addressed through the judicial selection process. See Mary L. Clark, Judicial Retirement and Return to
Practice, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 841, 844 (2011) (noting importance of judicial integrity, independence
and impartiality); see also ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, supra note 37, Canon 1 (“A judge
shall uphold and promote the, independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”); id. at Canon 2 (“A judge shall perform the duties of
judicial office impartially, competently, and diligently.”).
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If judicial education is intended to address judicial performance as a whole,
then those persons involved in the development of a judicial curriculum must
understand what it is that judges do.44 However, the process is inadequately understood by both judges45 and legal academics.46 As a result, it is difficult or impossible to answer many of the core questions involving judicial education.

B. Excessive Reliance on Judicial Selection As a Predictor of Judicial
Competence
Although there may not be much research concerning what it means to be a
judge, there is a considerable amount of scholarship concerning the process of
selecting judges.47 Traditionally, the United States has placed a great deal of emphasis on judicial selection procedures as a means of identifying candidates who
will have a successful career on the bench. 48 However, a number of concerns
have been raised about whether and to what extent judicial selection procedures
can actually be relied upon to produce good judges. 49 Some commentators have
gone so far as to conclude that “no selection method can guarantee the continued
fitness of the judiciary.”50
However, society does not need to rely on the judicial selection process as the
exclusive means of ensuring good judicial performance. Instead, judicial education can provide additional, and in many ways more direct, means of improving

44

See THOMAS, supra note 17, at 14-15.
For example, “even the most learned judges have acknowledged that they do not understand how
judges make decisions.” Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 782
(2001).
46
Some preliminary work has been done on these subjects, although much of the existing analysis
is from judges themselves. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2010); Chris Guthrie et al.,
Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007); Chris Guthrie,
Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 420 (2007); Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First
Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049 (2006); Edward Rubin, The Real Formalists, the Real Realists, and
What They Tell Us About Judicial Decision Making and Legal Education, 109 MICH. L. REV. 863
(2011); Kim McLane Wardlaw, Umpires, Empathy, and Activism: Lessons From Judge Cardozo, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1629 (2010). While useful, more work is warranted, particularly from academics. See supra note 33 (noting that although the judicial perspective is useful, independent analysis of
judicial functions is also important). The lack of academic involvement in these issues has been seen
as problematic. See THOMAS, supra note 17, at 113 (“One critic has drawn a connection between the
need for reform in the field of continuing education for judges . . . and the lack of academic interest in
judicial studies . . . . He maintains that university research on the efficiency of the judicial system, on
the sociological background of the judiciary, on recruitment, evaluation, promotion, and even on the
acceptance of the courts by the public is almost non-existent, and there have been few major developments in this field since the 1970s.”).
47
For example, commentators have noted the potentially detrimental role that politics can play in
both judicial elections and judicial appointments. See Norman L. Greene, Perspectives From the Rule
of Law and International Economic Development: Are There Lessons For Reform of Judicial Selection
in the United States? 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 53, 112-14 (2008); Jonathan Remy Nash, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2168, 2184-85 (2006); Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic
Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 586-87 (2005); Joanna M.
Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too? 58 DUKE L. J. 1589, 1592 (2009).
48
See Kadens, supra note 1, at 143-45.
49
See Wayne Doane, Note, The Membership of Judges in Gender Discriminatory Clubs, 12 VT. L.
REV. 459, 461 (1987); see also Fisher, supra note 8, at 164.
50
Doane, supra note 49, at 461; see also Fisher, supra note 8, at 164 (concluding many judges
“turn out to be ill-suited for the job,” despite having survived rigorous selection procedures).
45
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performance on the bench. 51 Unfortunately, the current fixation with judicial selection procedures has usurped the more logical debate about judicial education as
a means of ensuring and promoting excellence in judging. So long as judicial
selection is seen as a proxy for judicial competence, the discussion about judicial
education will be shortchanged.

C. Concerns About Judicial Independence
The final issue to consider involves judicial independence. Traditionally,
judges in the United States have opposed mandatory forms of judicial education
on the grounds that such practices infringe upon judicial independence. 52 Furthermore, concerns about judicial independence have also affected determinations
about who is to develop educational programming for judges. Thus, Chief Justice
William Rehnquist once went so far as to claim that “[j]udicial independence is
enhanced when the third branch controls judicial education, research and planning.”53
Given this background, it is perhaps understandable that some academics
might hesitate before involving themselves in the debate over judicial education.
Even so, commentators have long recognized that judicial independence can be
carried too far and devolve into judicial hubris. 54 As a result, it is necessary to
determine whether assertions about the need to protect judicial independence are
legitimate or whether judicial independence is being used as a stand-in for other,
perhaps less praiseworthy concerns. 55
One reason why some judges may resist anything other than purely voluntary
forms of judicial education may be the belief that judicial education diminishes
the prestige or “mystique” of the judiciary and thereby damages the legitimacy of
the institution.56 However, it is possible to view judicial education efforts not as
evidence of a failing judiciary but instead as a means of ensuring a competent and

51

See THOMAS, supra note 17, at 13-17.
Mandatory judicial education can relate either to the need to undertake some form of judicial
education (regardless of content) or specific types of judicial education (such as that relating to implicit
bias, domestic violence, etc.). See ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 171.
53
William H. Rehnquist, 1994 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 18 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 499, 507 (1995). Some commentators have also suggested that judicial education not only
does not infringe on judicial independence but can actually enhance it. See James B. Eaglin & Matthew Alex Ward, Enhancing the Administration of Justice and Strengthening Judicial Independence
Through Independent, Judicial-Based Research Centers, 7 J. LEGAL TECH. RISK MGMT. 77, 108
(2014); see also RUSSELL WHEELER, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: ITS RELATION TO JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE 42 (1988).
54
See Andrew M. Hall, Book Review, Lusky and the Long Dark Road, 11 J. L. & POL. 213, 214
(1995); Maimon Schwarzschild, Judicial Independence and Judicial Hubris, in THE CULTURE OF
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES 177, 178
(Shimon Shetreet & Christopher Forsyth eds., 2012); see also Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton,
Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 587, 588-90, 594 (2009); Brett G. Scharffs, The Character of Legal Reasoning, 61 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 733, 768 (2004) (“Common themes in discussions of judges include their tendency to become
arrogant . . . .”).
55
See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
56
See ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 29; Kadens, supra note 1, at 143.
52
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well-informed bench.57 Indeed, judicial education has been said to be an effective
means of promoting public confidence in the judiciary. 58
Another reason why judges may resist mandatory forms of judicial education
may be due to content-based concerns.59 For example, some judges may believe
that they do not need instruction on a particular issue or that the material in question is somehow inappropriate for a judge to consider. 60 However, social science
research indicates that judges often are unaware of certain gaps in their
knowledge.61 Concerns regarding “inappropriate” instruction also appear inapt
because the primary function of a judge is to distinguish between relevant and
irrelevant material. Indeed, some judges have accepted invitations to attend industry-sponsored judicial education programs at luxury resorts based on the claim
that, as judges, they are fully capable of distinguishing between objective educational material and special interest group propaganda.62

D. Effects of the Invisible Barriers to Research Concerning Judicial Education
Although the discussion in the preceding subsections is quite brief, the underlying sentiments run deep within the judiciary and thus should be taken quite seriously. However, it is in many ways easier to explain the rationales behind various
obstacles to research concerning judicial education than it is to justify their continued effect on legal scholarship. In fact, allowing these invisible barriers to
legal research to continue to bar critical commentary of judicial education would
simply reinforce the “mystique” of the judiciary and allows judges to wield significant if not exclusive control over matters relating to their own professional educations.63
Finding the current approach to judicial education problematic does not require a determination that the judiciary is acting in bad faith. Indeed, commentators have explicitly recognized that “regulatory capture can occur despite the desire of public officials to protect the public.”64 Therefore, any analysis regarding
57

See THOMAS, supra note 17, at 136.
See ABA Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary, supra note 16, at 55 (“There is more at
stake here than simply promoting judicial competence. The continuing legitimacy of our judicial institutions requires that a process be in place to reassure the public that the judges who interpret our laws,
rule on our civil claims, resolve disputes affecting our families, and sentence our citizens are capable
and highly qualified.”); see also supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
59
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
60
To some extent, this objection may be ideologically based. For example, conservative judges
may be more opposed to judicial education programs attempting to demonstrate the existence and
effect of implicit bias, since conservatives “may be more inclined than liberals to justify and use their
implicit biases for explicit judgment.” See Gregory S. Parks & Matthew W. Hughey, Opposing Affirmative Action: The Social Psychology of Political Ideology and Racial Attitudes, 57 HOW. L.J. 513,
537 (2014).
61
See infra notes 85-90. Social scientists have also determined that certain types of cultural outlooks actually affect perceptions of fact. See Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 107, 109 (2010) (discussing the work of Yale Law School’s Cultural Cognition Project)
[hereinafter Secunda, Cultural Cognition].
62
See Douglas T. Kendall & Eric Sorkin, Nothing for Free: How Private Judicial Seminars Are
Undermining Environmental Protections and Breaking the Public’s Trust, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
405, 469-80 (2001).
63
Kadens, supra note 1, at 143.
64
Shapiro, supra note 26, at 222.
58
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regulatory capture must focus on objective rather than subjective elements. A
number of those issues are considered in the following section.

III. JUDICIAL EDUCATION, JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE AND JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF JUDICIAL EDUCATION
Previously it was suggested that the paucity of academic research concerning
judicial education could be due to the fact that the reforms of the 1960s and 1970s
effectively resolved all of the important issues in this field.65 If true, then the
question of regulatory capture could be considered moot, given that the definition
of regulatory capture contemplates some sort of negative effect on the public. 66
However, as the following subsections suggest, judicial education in the United
States does not appear to be problem-free.

A. Public Perception of Judicial Performance
The first issue to consider is whether the reforms of the 1960s and 1970s have
fully and finally fixed any problems associated with judicial education in the
United States. As it turns out, there is some evidence to support the conclusion
that the judicial education system is operating at acceptable levels of efficiency
and competence. For example, public perception polls often suggest that the judiciary is functioning relatively well, at least in comparison to other branches of
government.67 However, closer examination of the data indicates that public perception of judicial performance is not all that high when considered in absolute
numbers.68 Furthermore, confidence in the courts is lowest among those with
direct experience with the judicial system. 69
This information has triggered a number of questions about the quality of judicial performance in this country. 70 While some criticisms of judges’ behavior
(such as that relating to “judicial activism”) can be framed in political or ideological terms,71 a number of content-neutral concerns have also been raised. 72 Misgiv65

See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
67
See Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Michael Hennessy, Public Understanding of and Support for the
Courts: Survey Results, 95 GEO. L.J. 899, 900 (2007); The State of State Courts: A 2014 NCSC Public
Opinion Survey, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/
PDF/Topics/Public%20Trust%20and%20Confidence/2014-State-of-State-Courts-Survey12042014.ashx.
68
Although the judiciary tends to be rated more highly than other branches of government in
public perception polls, the numbers—which often range from approximately 50 percent to 70 percent,
depending on the question asked—are still relatively weak by any objective measure. See Jamieson &
Hennessy, supra note 67, at 900; NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 67; see also Fisher,
supra note 8, at 186-89.
69
See Jamieson & Hennessy, supra note 67, at 901-02; NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra
note 67, at 3.
70
See David C. Brody, The Use of Judicial Performance Evaluation to Enhance Judicial Accountability, Judicial Independence, and Public Trust, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 115, 115 (2008); Jean E.
Dubofsky, Judicial Performance Review: A Balance Between Judicial Independence and Public Accountability, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 315 (2007); Fisher, supra note 8, at 186-89.
71
See Brody, supra note 70, at 116; see also Timothy M. Phelps, Federal Judges Faces Possible
Impeachment, MSN (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/federal-judge-facespossible-impeachment/ar-AA9NGO6 (discussing a Republican-appointed federal judge who was
66
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ings have also been expressed about judicial behavior from the bench, including
the apparent increase in reports of judicial incivility, 73 judicial insensitivity74 and
self-perceived judicial invincibility. 75
Some people dismiss these types of issues as uncharacteristic of the judiciary
as a whole.76 However, many if not all of these incidents could have been avoided
if the individuals in question had received appropriate forms of judicial education
before the episodes occurred.77 Thus, it does not appear as if the current approach
to judicial education is entirely successful.

B. Judicial Perception of Judicial Performance
Closer examination of the various types of problematic behaviors discussed
above suggests that many can be traced back to the so-called “mystique” of the
denounced after putting a former Democratic government in manacles following a corruption conviction).
72
For example, concerns have been enunciated about written decisions and opinions that are less
than respectful of the parties and/or other members of judiciary. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes
Are You Going To Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV.
837, 842 (2009) (noting that some interpretive methods “incur [a] cost to democratic legitimacy associated with labeling the perspective of persons who share a particular cultural identity ‘unreasonable’
and hence unworthy of consideration in the adjudicatory process”). Indeed, there is even a “sarcasm
index” rating various judges. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Scalia Tops Law Prof’s Sarcasm Index, ABA
L.J. (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/scalia_tops_law_profs_sarcasm_index
(noting that “heavy use of sarcasm can demean the court, and . . . arguably demonstrates . . . lack of
respect for the legal opinions of . . . colleagues” (citation omitted)).
73
See Rene Stutzman, Brevard Judge Who Got Into Courthouse Fistfight Faces Formal Charges,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/osfighting-judge-brevard-20140814-story.html.
74
See Bill Chappell, Montana Judge is Publicly Censured Over 30-Day Sentence For Rape, NPR
(July 22, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/07/22/334069164/montana-judge-ispublicly-censured-over-30-day-sentence-for-rape; Lynn Hecht Schafran, There’s No Accounting for
Judges, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1063, 1063-65, 1067 (1995).
75
See Valerie Richardson, Scalia Defends Keeping God, Religion in Public Square, WASH. TIMES
(Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/oct/1/justice-antonin-scalia-defendskeeping-god-religio/?page=all (quoting U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia as saying: “What
can they do to me? I have life tenure.”).
76
For example, the judge who engaged in the fistfight was said to have acted out of character and
was sent to anger management training. See Dan Kedmey, Florida Judge Deals Out Justice With His
Fists, TIME (June 3, 2014), http://time.com/2818369/florida-judge-courtroom-fight/; see also supra
note 73. Although some types of bad behavior (such as Justice Scalia’s heavy-handed use of sarcasm
and other demeaning tactics) are supported by certain members of the lay and legal communities,
commentators have suggested that actions not only injure the judiciary but appear to have harmed the
judge in question. See Garrett Epps, The Twilight of Antonin Scalia, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 21, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/08/the-twilight-of-antonin-scalia/378884/ (suggesting that Justice Scalia’s influence is waning); Kahan et al., supra note 72, at 842-43; Weiss, supra note
72.
77
See Kathleen E. Mahoney, The Myth of Judicial Neutrality: The Role of Judicial Education in
the Fair Administration of Justice, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 785, 815 (1996); Paul M. Secunda, Cognitive Illiberalism and Institutional Debiasing Strategies, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 373, 375 (2012) [hereinafter Secunda, Debiasing]. Of course, judicial education will only resolve such issues if the judges in
question are required to attend educational programming. Supreme Court justices, such as Justice
Scalia, are not required to undergo any type of judicial education. Indeed, Justice Scalia has been
known to teach judicial education courses, including those relating to judicial writing, despite criticism
of his writing style. See Duke Law, Center for the Study of Judicial Studies, Faculty for Summer
2013, http://law.duke.edu/judicialstudies/degree/faculty/ (listing Justice Scalia as teaching a course on
judicial writing); see also Kahan et al., supra note 72, at 842-43; Weiss, supra note 72.
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judge.”78 While the aura surrounding judges may contribute to a necessary sense
of respect for the judiciary, 79 such sentiments can be problematic if they generate
overconfidence (sometimes described in the literature as “judicial hubris”) that
results in questionable judicial practices.80 Although judges are not the only ones
prone to overconfidence, commentators have suggested that “one can make a persuasive argument that the natural human foibles such as . . . overconfidence . . .
become exacerbated, rather than reduced, because of the isolation in which judges
work and the pedestal upon which they are placed.” 81 Judges may also be inclined
to overestimate the importance of intellectual prowess over interpersonal and other types of skills necessary to the art of judging. 82
Concerns about overconfidence among judges are particularly relevant to the
current discussion because judges in the United States are largely in control of
their own educational agendas, both individually and institutionally. 83 Some
judges (most notably those on the federal bench) do not ever need to undertake
any form of judicial education.84
A system that allows individuals to choose for themselves the content and
timing of their professional education is somewhat questionable in light of research indicating that persons “who are overconfident . . . make poor [educational]
choices compared to learners who are uncertain about their knowledge.” 85 The
situation is further exacerbated by the fact that some supremely overconfident
people—particularly those who are given a great deal of deference in their jobs—
are highly unlikely to learn from experience.86

78

Kadens, supra note 1, at 143; see also supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
See Fried, supra note 1, at 1227.
80
See Jeffrey M. Stempel, In Praise of Procedurally Centered Judicial Disqualification – And a
Stronger Conception of the Appearance Standard: Better Acknowledging and Adjusting to Cognitive
Bias, Spoliation, and Perceptual Realities, 30 REV. LITIG. 733, 741, 744 (2011); see also supra note 54
and accompanying text.
81
Stempel, supra note 80, at 744.
82
See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. Some authorities suggest that “[s]mart people
overestimate the importance of being a smart person.” Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyers in Failed Firms
Overestimated the Importance of Being Smart, Law Dean Says, ABA J. (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.
abajournal.com/news/article/lawyers_in_failed_firms_overestimate_the_importance_of_being_smart_l
aw_dean (quoting Dean Frank Wu of Hastings Law School).
83
Most states mandate some form of judicial education for sitting judges, although the requirements are set at the local level and can vary widely. See NAT’L JUDICIAL EDUC. PROGRAM, supra note
14, at 15; ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 13, 29-40; Murrell & Gould, supra note 14, at 136. As a
result, judges in both state and federal court are usually allowed to choose their own curriculum. The
concept of mandatory judicial education remains fraught, even though some people believe that judicial education should be considered part of a judge’s continuing ethical duty. See NAT’L JUDICIAL
EDUC. PROGRAM, supra note 14, at 15 (“Judicial education is essential to judges’ ability to meet the
obligations of Canon 3: A Judge Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently.”); see also id. (noting some judges find mandatory judicial education “insulting”).
84
Although incoming federal judges are not required to attend new judge orientations offered by
the FJC, most do. However, there is no continuing judicial education requirement for federal judges
and no systematic approach to developing certain skills.
85
Jennifer M. Cooper, Smarter Law Learning: Using Cognitive Science to Maximize Law Learning, 44 CAP. U. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2016).
86
See Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance,
CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 693 (2005). Empirical evidence also
shows that those persons (such as judges) who are more socially dominant are more confident in their
judgments, regardless of actual ability. See Stephen V. Burks et al., Overconfidence and Social Signalling, 2013 REV. ECON. STUD. 1, 4.
79
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Overconfidence is not the only characteristic that affects decisions regarding
educational programming. For example, empirical studies suggest that individuals
do not seek training in subjects they believe they have already mastered.87 Furthermore, some issues, such as those relating to implicit bias, are extremely difficult to reach through voluntary training programs because “these cognitive processes can operate implicitly, or at a level below conscious awareness, . . . [and
thus] can bias judgment and behavior in ways that go unnoticed by the individual.”88 As a result, those judges who do not believe that they are prone to implicit
bias or who do not find such biases problematic may not choose to receive training in this particular subject matter area,89 even though social scientists and judicial education experts all agree that “[e]veryone, judges . . . included, harbors
attitudes and stereotypes that influence how he or she perceives and interacts with
the social world.”90

C. Judicial Education and Judicial Performance
Problems associated with overconfidence, implicit bias and similar issues can
be addressed through educational measures.91 However, a voluntary, judge-led
system of education does not seem to be well-suited to resolving these sorts of
matters, since those persons who are most in need of instruction on particular
issues are perhaps least likely to choose programming on those topics. 92 Indeed,
many judges find certain forms of judicial education “insulting” and “strenuously
oppose” efforts to impose any educational requirements on the judiciary. 93
This phenomenon raises a second type of concern, namely the control that the
judiciary exerts over the content of judicial education. At this point, most of the
faculty on judicial education courses are judges themselves, even if the judges
have no special expertise in education or in the subject matter under discussion. 94

87
See Cooper, supra note 85. Furthermore, students who believe themselves to be under time
pressure (as many sitting judges are) often choose not to focus on material that they believe will be
difficult to learn. See id.
88
Helping Courts Address Implicit Bias: Resources for Education, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, http://www.ncsc.org/ibeducation (last visited Aug. 7, 2015); see also Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1146-48, 1172-79 (2012). Similar problems
occur with respect to domestic violence cases. See Schafran, supra note 74, at 1075.
89
For example, conservative judges may be more opposed to judicial education programs attempting to demonstrate the existence and effect of implicit bias, since conservatives “may be more inclined
than liberals to justify and use their implicit biases for explicit judgment.” See Parks & Hughey, supra
note 60, at 537.
90
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 88; see also Mahoney, supra note 77, at 815;
Secunda, Cultural Cognition, supra note 61, at 109; Secunda, Debiasing, supra note 77, at 375.
91
See Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict Case
Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 153 (2010); Mahoney, supra note 77, at 815; Secunda,
Debiasing, supra note 77, at 375.
92
See Cooper, supra note 85.
93
NAT’L JUDICIAL EDUC. PROGRAM, supra note 14, at 15 (“Mandatory judicial education is a
vexed question. Many judges find it insulting and strenuously oppose it.”); see also ARMYTAGE, supra
note 12, at 29-40, 169.
94
See Wallace, Asia, supra note 17, at 856 (reflecting the judicial view that a variety of courses,
including those regarding “avoiding bias . . . are more effectively taught by an experienced judge (even
one without formal judicial education) than by an ‘expert’ or ‘professor’ who usually does not have
practical experience and may be more inclined to ‘lecture’ than to ‘engage’ the learners”).
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Although experts in judicial education recognize the benefits of including outside
experts on faculty, the bias in favor of judges as faculty is overwhelming. 95
Those who act as faculty on judicial education programs obviously have a
great deal of control over both the content and method of presenting the material.96 However, individual judges can affect the educational curriculum in other
ways as well. For example, judicial education in the United States is a highly
susceptible subject to market pressures. 97 Because judges can pick and choose
which courses they will attend, any program that is considered too difficult or too
controversial will likely be poorly attended, which decreases the likelihood that
the program will be offered again in the future. 98 Indeed, commentators have
noted a significant lag in institutional adoption of programs that are seen as particularly challenging for judicial audiences. 99 Notably, market pressures affect
both for-profit and not-for-profit institutions, since both types of organizations are
accountable for their curricular choices.100
Judicial influence over the educational curriculum is pervasive not only at the
individual level, but also at the institutional level, as illustrated by the number of
judges serving on the advisory boards of organizations specializing in judicial
education.101 Although judicial input into programming is of course necessary,
“the conservative nature of the judicial branch, its many stakeholders, and its resulting reluctance to change” can thwart efforts to improve or modify existing
approaches to judicial education.102

IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS OF REGULATORY CAPTURE
Although more work needs to be conducted before a definitive conclusion can
be reached, the various problems that remain unaddressed by the current approach
to judicial education, the high degree of control currently wielded by the judiciary
over judicial education and the resistance by judges to any independent, external
95
Compare Schafran, supra note 74, at 1072 n.52 (“Effective judicial education requires a combination of expert presentation by judicial and nonjudicial faculty and interactive exercises in which
judges practice applying their new knowledge.”) with Wallace, Asia, supra note 17, at 856.
96
Although judges are usually not responsible for developing the content of the courses they teach
(that task is typically carried out by full-time staff members at the sponsoring organization), judicial
faculty are free to interpret the materials provided to them in any way they like, and it is not uncommon for judges to ignore some suggested material in favor of other issues.
97
See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Refocusing Away From Rules Reform and Devoting More Attention to
the Deciders, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 335, 363 n.116 (2010).
98
See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (noting that learners tend to avoid difficult material, if given the chance).
99
See Stempel, supra note 97, at 363 n.116.
100
For-profit institutions have an obvious financial interest in maximizing class attendance. However, not-for-profit institutions may be under similar pressures to fill their courses, particularly if those
organizations are subject to oversight from legislative or other bodies with control over the judicial
education entity’s budget. See 28 U.S.C. § 628 (2015) (noting appropriations and accounting procedures for the FJC).
101
See 28 U.S.C. §621 (2015) (listing members of the supervisory board of the FJC); Faculty
Council, NAT’L JUDICIAL COUNCIL, http://www.judges.org/about/faculty-council.html (last visited
Aug. 7, 2015) (helping “ensure that quality teaching standards are maintained and that the curricula
offered are relevant, challenging and invigorating to the College’s participants” and entirely made up
of judges); see also 2014 FJC Annual Report, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 12, at 14 (listing members of various FJC Committees, some of which are entirely made of judges).
102
Elizabeth Dennis, Leading Into the Future: Securing the Public Trust in Texas Courts, 51 S.
TEX. L. REV. 839, 840 (2010).
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oversight of judicial education suggest that this particular field has been subject to
regulatory capture.103 The question, therefore, is what should be done now.
Scholars have identified “three different responses to the problem of regulatory capture: accountability, independence, and transparency.”104 Applying those
principles to judicial education suggests a need for (1) increased external input
over programming choices (independence); (2) increased mechanisms to measure
whether and to what extent judges are engaging in appropriate forms of judicial
education (accountability); and/or (3) increased publicity about the nature, quality
and success of judicial education (transparency). While these sorts of reforms
obviously cannot be implemented overnight, there are a number of initiatives that
can assist with the process.

A. Independence
The first potential solution to regulatory capture—independence—
contemplates the need to establish a certain amount of distance between the regulatory entity and the regulated entity. This goal can be achieved in the field of
judicial education by allowing academics, experts and independent stakeholders to
have a stronger voice in matters relating to judicial education. Input should be
sought not only regarding the content of judicial education but also the question of
whether and to what extent mandatory programming is necessary. Notably, this
process cannot be initiated by or include members of either the legislative or executive branch of government, since that would raise separation of powers concerns.105
When considering how best to implement this procedure, reformers can look
to other countries that have successfully integrated outside voices into discussions
about judicial education. For example, Canada has adopted a “three pillar” approach to judicial education which considers input from judges, academics, and
the community.106

B. Accountability
The second potential solution to regulatory capture—accountability—would
require members of the regulated entity (i.e., judges) to be held accountable for
their actions so as to minimize potential wrongdoing and encourage voluntary
compliance with any necessary standards of behavior. This issue has been already
been discussed in the United States in the context of the debate about judicial

103
See Reiss, supra note 22, at 571-72; see also supra notes 32-102 and accompanying text. For
example, more research needs to be conducted regarding the negative externalities generated by the
current system, although reports regarding problematic judicial behavior suggest such evidence can be
found. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
104
Roger Van Den Bergh, Economic Criteria for Applying the Subsidiarity Principle in the European Community: The Case of Competition Policy, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 363, 378 (1996); see
also Shapiro, supra note 26, at 249-55 (noting also that creating the political will for reform is important).
105
See ELIZABETH B. BAZAN & MORTON ROSENBERG, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF JUDGES
AND JUSTICES (May 31, 2005), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32935.pdf (discussing scope
and limits on congressional oversight of the federal judiciary).
106
See THOMAS, supra note 17, at 50.
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evaluation procedures that could identify areas where improvement in judicial
practices is needed, either by individual judges or the judiciary as a whole. 107
Although judicial assessments are routinely conducted in civil law jurisdictions,108 judges in the United States have traditionally resisted such measures
based on concerns about judicial independence 109 and separation of powers.110
However, some commentators have claimed that judicial evaluations can increase
the legitimacy of the judiciary by offsetting negative information generated during
judicial election campaigns.111
A full-fledged debate about the propriety of judicial evaluation programs is
beyond the scope of the current Essay. However, some experts in judicial education have avoided these types of concerns by suggesting the use of needs assessments rather than judicial evaluations to determine what type of judicial programming would be useful to judges.112

C. Transparency
The third response to regulatory capture—transparency—would involve increased knowledge and scrutiny of both the content and the process of judicial
education in this country. The burden for this particular process will likely fall to
the academic community, although other members of civil society could also participate in the dissemination and analysis of information about judicial education
procedures.
Although there is much yet to be done in this regard, there have been a number of recent efforts that could increase transparency regarding judicial educa-

107
See STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT: REGARDING A JUDICIAL
EVALUATION FORM, 3 HAW. B.J. 9 (1999); Eaglin & Ward, supra note 53, at 78-88; Shepherd, supra
note 47, at 1592. However, measuring the quality of judicial decision-making is a difficult task, since
many issues are subjective or are outside the judge’s control. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati,
Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L.
REV. 23, 32 (2004); Frank B. Cross & Stephanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383,
1388-99 (2009) (discussing “productivity, quality and independence” as relevant criteria and noting
criticism of research methodologies); Chad M. Oldfather, Against Accuracy (As A Measure of Judicial
Performance), 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 493, 494-95 (2014).
108
See THOMAS, supra note 17, at 115.
109
See Shepherd, supra note 47, at 1592; THOMAS, supra note 17, at 115. The concern is that
material gained from judicial evaluations could be used for punitive purposes, particularly in jurisdictions where judges are subject to re-election. See Shepherd, supra note 47, at 1592. However, judicial
evaluations can be used for more benign purposes. See Eaglin & Ward, supra note 53, at 78-88 (discussing judicial research centers).
110
See BAZAN & ROSENBERG, supra note 105, at 1-6.
111
See Penny J. White, Using Judicial Performance Evaluations to Supplement Inappropriate Voter
Cues and Enhance Judicial Legitimacy, 74 MO. L. REV. 635, 652-54 (2009).
112
See ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 67-83 (discussing pros and cons of needs assessments as well
as various methodologies); see also Good Judicial Training Practices, EUROPEAN JUDICIAL TRAINING
NETWORK, http://www.ejtn.eu/Resources/Good-judicial-training-practices/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2015)
(containing various types of needs assessments). Still, assessing the needs of the judiciary can be a
difficult task. See Shirley A. Dobbin et al., Surveying Difficult Populations: Lessons Learned From A
National Survey of State Trial Court Judges, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 287, 287-304 (2001); see also Frank M.
Coffin & Robert A. Katzmann, Steps Towards Optimal Judicial Workways: Perspectives From the
Federal Bench, 59 N.Y. UNIV. ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 377, 391-92 (2003). Although it is useful to ask
judges what issues they find most important, one cannot rely exclusively on self-assessment to determine educational needs and goals. See Dobbin et al., supra note 112, at 288.
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tion.113 One of the more useful of these initiatives involves a recent symposium
organized by the University of Missouri’s Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution and entitled “Judicial Education and the Art of Judging: From Myth to Methodology.” The symposium generated a number of articles relating to judicial education and provided numerous insights into how the current system can be improved. The contributions to this symposium fell into three basic categories and
addressed a number of issues raised in this Essay.
First, a number of papers, including “Judging as Judgment: Tying Judicial
Education to Adjudication Theory” by Professor Robert Bone and “Of Judges,
Law, and the River: Tacit Knowledge and the Judicial Role” by Professor Chad
Oldfather, considered the often-overlooked question of what it means to be a
judge.114 As noted previously, this issue is critical to questions relating to judicial
education, since it is impossible to develop an appropriate curriculum without
knowing what it is that judges do.115 Indeed, Professor Bone made a direct connection between these two concepts, stating
[t]he choice of curriculum depends on controversial assumptions about
what constitutes good judging. This means that one must first formulate a
reasonably coherent conception of good judging before one can design
effective judicial education courses. It is not enough merely to teach a
menu of different options from which judges can choose. Proper
adjudication is not something individual judges decide as a matter of
personal preference or conviction. A judge has a duty, by virtue of her
role within the existing system of adjudication, to act in a manner
consistent with the core principles and practices of that institution. As a
result, she has an obligation to formulate a theory of adjudication that fits
the institution in a normatively attractive way. 116
Professor Oldfather also considered the connection between judicial education and the art of judging. He framed the challenge of educating judges as involving three different elements:
The first is that the law affords a great deal of discretion to judges.
Sometimes this is by design, and sometimes it is a product of the inherent
underdeterminacy of much law. The second is that in exercising this discretion judges are susceptible to an array of unconscious influences often
regarded as illegitimate, and that if unchecked threaten to undermine the
rule of law. The third is that the inarticulable nature of judicial decisionmaking means that good judging necessarily entails drawing on another
113
For example, the dissolution of the American Judicature Society in 2014 put the future of “Judicature,” one of the preeminent publications in the area of judicial studies, at risk. However, Duke Law
School has agreed to take over publication of the journal through Duke’s Center for Judicial Studies.
See Duke Law Center for Judicial Studies to Assume Publication of Judicature, DUKE L. NEWS (Nov.
20, 2014), http://law.duke.edu/news/duke-law-center-judicial-studies-assume-publication-judicature/.
114
See Robert G. Bone, Judging as Judgment: Tying Judicial Education to Adjudication Theory,
2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 129 [hereinafter Bone, Judging]; Chad M. Oldfather, Of Judges, Law, and the
River: Tacit Knowledge and the Judicial Role, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 155 [hereinafter Oldfather, Judicial Role].
115
See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
116
Bone, Judging, supra note 114, at 152.
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sort of unconscious influence—in this case, one that we want to celebrate
and cultivate. The challenge thus stems from the need to give play to
some unconscious influences but not others, and it is complicated by the
fact that the line between legitimate and illegitimate influences is both
blurry and contestable.117
A second set of articles from the symposium focused on the goals and purposes of judicial education. Contributions in this category included “What Judges
Want and Need: User-Friendly Foundations for Effective Judicial Education” by
the Honorable Duane Benton, “Judicial Bias: The Ongoing Challenge” by Professor Kathleen Mahoney, “International Arbitration, Judicial Education and Legal
Elites” by Professor Catherine Rogers, “Toward a New Paradigm of Judicial Education” by the Honorable Mary Russell and “Writing Reasoned Decisions and
Opinions: A Guide For Novice, Experienced and Foreign Judges” by Professor
S.I. Strong.118 Although a few scholars have previously touched on questions
relating to the judicial curriculum, 119 the contributions from the symposium took a
significant step forward in identifying topics of particular concern to judges.120
The articles come at curricular issues from a wide range of perspectives. For
example, two authors considered judicial education from an international and
comparative standpoint. This approach is particularly intriguing because the
United States is often considered an “exporter” of judicial education programming
and innovations.121 However, there is much that can be learned from other jurisdictions, particularly the National Judicial Institute (NJI) of Canada 122 and the
European Judicial Training Network (EJTN),123 which both provide excellent
examples of how to develop a sophisticated curriculum for judges that includes
both substance and skills.
The Canadian perspective was reflected in the article written by Professor
Mahoney, who provided a number of insights into how Canada is handling matters relating to implicit bias concerning race, gender and class. 124 Professor Rog117

Oldfather, Judicial Role, supra note 114, at 156-57.
See Duane Benton & Jennifer A.L. Sheldon-Sherman, What Judges Want and Need: UserFriendly Foundations for Effective Judicial Education, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 23; Kathleen Mahoney,
Judicial Bias: The Ongoing Challenge, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 43; Catherine A. Rogers, International
Arbitration, Judicial Education and Legal Elites, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 71; Mary R. Russell, Toward a
New Paradigm of Judicial Education, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 79; Strong, Writing, supra note 9, at 93.
119
Existing scholarship is relatively sparse. See Rosemary Cairns Way & Daphne Gilbert, Resisting the Hidden Curriculum: Teaching for Social Justice, 2 CANADIAN LEGAL EDUC. ANN. REV. 1
(2008); Rosemary Cairns Way, Reconceptualizing Professional Responsibility: Incorporating Equality, 25 DALHOUSIE L.J. 27 (2002); Fisher, supra note 8, at 189-201 (discussing the concept, content and
rationale of introductory judicial education); J. Clifford Wallace, The Globalization of Judicial Education, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 355, 358-59 (2003) [hereinafter Wallace, Globalization].
120
See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
121
See Rule of Law Initiative (ROLI), ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule_of_law.
html (last visited Aug. 7, 2015); USAID: JUDICIAL REFORM & GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT,
http://www.jrga.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=65&Itemid=28&lang=e
n (last visited Aug. 7, 2015); Strong, Writing, supra note 9, at 96; Wallace, Globalization, supra note
119, at 364.
122
See NAT’L JUDICIAL INST., https://www.nji-inm.ca/index.cfm/judicial-education/the-nji-sjudicial-education-portfolio/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2015) (including a course calendar that discusses the
“craft of judging,” including judge craft, court craft and professional craft).
123
See European Judicial Training Network Methodologies, EJTN, http://www.ejtn.eu/
Methodologies--Resources/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2015).
124
See id.
118
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ers took more of an international approach and considered whether and to what
extent judicial education about a particular international dispute resolution procedure (i.e., international arbitration) can improve judicial practices involving domestic disputes. Among other things, Professor Rogers noted that
[i]t is often assumed that the only form of judicial education needed for
international arbitration is training on how to keep judicial “hands off”
arbitration proceedings and outcomes. International arbitration reforms,
however, integrate judges into various aspects of reforms, which in turn
provide potential inspiration for improvements in local judiciaries.125
The discussion about curriculum development then shifted from international
to institutional concerns. Thus, Chief Justice Russell wrote about how state court
judges can obtain innovative educational programming through creative statewide
initiatives126 while Judge Benton offered two different proposals—one relating to
judicial evaluations and one relating to educational vouchers—intended to improve the current educational model. 127
The analysis also included an article involving judicial education at the individual level. As that submission recognized, many judges have extraordinarily
busy dockets and “find it hard to make the time to attend in-person seminars, particularly given expanding workloads and decreasing budgets. For those people, a
published guide . . . may be the best way to trigger new ways of thinking” about
particular issues.128 That article focused primarily on issues relating to judicial
writing, since that subject is particularly amenable to written, as opposed to inperson, guidance.129
The third and final topic covered by the symposium involved not content but
methodology. Papers falling under this heading included “Educating Judges:
Where To From Here?” by Dr. Livingston Armytage and “Judicial Education:
Pedagogy for a Change” by Professor Brettel Dawson. 130 These contributions
discussed best practices in judicial education, as informed by research into adult
learning practices and the distinctive attributes of judges as learners. 131 Educators
who incorporate these proposals into their training programs can help increase
judicial confidence in judicial education by moving past the “talking head” model
of professional programming and creating the sort of practical coursework that
judges want and need.132

125

Rogers, supra note 118, at 72.
See Russell, supra note 118, at 86.
127
See Benton, supra note 118, at 36.
128
Strong, Writing, supra note 9, at 128.
129
See id.
130
See Livingston Armytage, Educating Judges: Where To From Here? 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 167;
T. Brettel Dawson, Judicial Education: Pedagogy for a Change, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 175.
131
See MALCOLM S. KNOWLES, THE MODERN PRACTICE OF ADULT EDUCATION: FROM PEDAGOGY
TO ANDRAGOGY 45-49 (1980) (distinguishing andragogy, the teaching of adults, from pedagogy, the
teaching of children); Joni Larson, The Intersection of Andragogy and Distance Education: Handing
Over the Reins of Learning to Better Prepare Students for the Practice of Law, 9 T.M. COOLEY J.
PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 117, 123-24 (2007). These principles have been successfully applied in the
context of judicial education. See ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 106-11, 127-30.
132
See Wallace, Asia, supra note 17, at 856.
126
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V. CONCLUSION
As the preceding sections suggest, the field of judicial education is filled with
controversies and challenges. Indeed, reports suggest that the judiciary is currently in a state of “crisis” because “most judges are ill-prepared for the challenges,
personal and professional, of a judicial career, and many of them turn out to be illsuited for the job.”133 This may be in part because the field of judicial education
appears to have stagnated since the reforms of the 1960s and 1970s. While this
phenomenon could be caused by a number of factors, regulatory capture of judicial education by the judiciary would appear to be at least one possibility.
Experts agree that a well-functioning judiciary is critical to the creation of an
effective system of justice.134 Given the problems currently facing U.S. courts, it
appears to be time to rethink strategies and methodologies that were put in place
over forty years ago, during the first judicial education reform movement. 135 Such
efforts would not only help individual judges perform their duties better, but
would go a long way toward improving public perception of and confidence in
U.S. state and federal courts.

133
134
135

Fisher, supra note 8, at 164.
See Lippman, supra note 19, at 1.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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